Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1970

Mine & Smelter Supply Company v. General Insurance Company
of America, Forcht Electric, Inc. And William C. Forcht, And The
Brezina Construction Company, Inc : Respondent's Brief

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.D. Clayton Fairbourn; Attorney for Respondent
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Mine & Smelter v. General Insurance, No. 11907 (1970).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4990

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

In the Supreme Court of the Slate of Utah
MINE & SMELTER SUPPLY
COMANY, a Colorado corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

GENERAL INSURANCE COMP ANY OF AMERICA,

Case No.
11907

Defendant and Appellant,

FORCHT ELECTIC, INC.; and
WILLIAM C. FORCHT; and the
BREZINA CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.;
Def en<Lants.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County
The Honorable D. Frank Wilkins, Judge
D. CLAYTON FAIRBOURN of
TURNER & FAIRBOURN
Valley Professional Plaza
2525 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Respondent
ALLAN E·. MECHAM
.~
CLYDID, MECHAM & PRAT'liJ
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant

11
tf

B
P ..,

r

n.:.:

D
• i

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

NATURE OF CASE ·······------------·-·--·····-·-----····-·-·····-··---------------·-·---

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT -----·--·---··-··----············--··-------

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL-------·---·-······--··---················---·-··-

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS----------------·--·-·---···-·····-···-···-·····-·········--

3

ARGUMENT·······---··-·-······--·····------·--···-·-··--·--·-··············--·······-········

8

POINT I
THE COURT PROPERLY RULED IN HOLDING THE
CERTAIN DOCUMENTS ENTITLED "WAIVERS OF
LIEN" TO BE RECEIPTS FOR PAYMENT OF INVOICES
AND NOT WAIVERS OR RELEASES. -····-······-·-·--··-··-··--········

8

POINT II
THE DEFENDANTS BREZINA CONSTRUCTION AND
GENERAL INSURANCE COMP ANY OF AMERICA ADMITTED IN THEIR ANSWER AND ANSWERS TO
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS THE EXECUTION OF THE PAYMENT BOND UPON WHICH THIS
ACTION IS PREDICATED.·····-··-···········-···-····-·····----·-······-··-·--·-·- 16
POINT Ill
THE COURT PROPERLY RULED IN AWARDING JUDGMENT TO THE PLAINTIFF. -···········---······-·-···-·-··-·········---·····-· 19

In the Supreme Court of the Stale of Utah
MINE & SMELTER SUPPLY
COMANY, a Colorado corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
GENERAL INSURANCJ1J COMP ANY OF AMERICA,
Defendant and Appellant,

Case No.
11907

FORCHT ELECTIC, INC.; and
WILLIAM C. FORCHT; and the
BREZINA CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.;
Defendants.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

To The Honorable Court:

·

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by plaintiff and respondent Mine &
Smelter Company, a material supplier against the surety,
General Insurance Company of America, on the bond on a
public building known as the Trade Technical College
Administration Building. This action was filed to recover
payment for electrical materials, supplies and fixtures
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furnished by the plaintiff which were used in the said
building. The original action included additional def endants: Forcht Electric, Inc., the electrical contractor; William C. Forcht, individually; and Brezina Construction
Company, Inc., the genPral contractor and principal
on the subject bond.
Defendants Brezina Construction Company, Inc. and
General Insurance Company of America filed a counterclaim against Mine & Smelter Supply Company alleging
misrepresentation and fraud in the inducement.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Brezina Construction Company was dismissed from
the action by stipulation of counsel for all parties. (R.
835, 836, 837) The Third Judicial District Court, at the
conclusion of six ( 6) days of testimony and review of a
detailed report of the Master, entered judgment against
Forcht Electric, Inc. and vVilliam C. Forcht jointly and
severally for $43,132.95 plus costs and attorney fees of
$4,951.33. From this judgment no appeal has been taken.
Judgment of $41,296.72 plus costs and attorney fees of
$4,951.33 was awarded against defendant General Insurance Company of America. The counterclaim of General
Insurance Company of America was denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent ~weks affirmation of the judgment
entered by the trial court.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mine & Smelter Supply Company (hereinafter ref erred to as Mine & Smelter), plaintiff and respondent,
furnished electrical materials, supplies and fixtures to
Forcht Electric, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Forcht
Electric), a subcontractor who had contracted to do the
electrical portion of the Trade Technical College Administration Building, a public building. Brezina Construction Company, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
Brezina) was the general contractor on the building.
BrBzina, in compliance witJ1 the bonding statutes of the
:-;b te of Utah obtained a bond Brezina was principal under the subject bond; General Insurance Company of
America (hereinafter referred to as General Insurance)
wa 3 surety, and Utah State Building Board was named
obligee for the benefit of claimants.
In the answer and amended answer of General Insurance, it was admitted that the subject bond was executed for the subject building and was done so in compliance with the provisions of Title 14-1-5 of the Utah Code
Annotated. (R. 2, 3, 13, 166) A pretrial and a portion
of the trial were held prior to the appellant issuing a
second amended answer in which it attempted to deny its
earlier admissions that the bond was executed pursuant
to the statute above quoted. Further procee.dings including another pretrial was held, but appellant at no
time urged that tJ1e subject bond failed to comply with the
statute until this point was raised in its brief.
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Appellant in its brief refers to two other jobs involving the Trade Technical College which it rders to as the
"Metals Building and Tunnel Project job::s," which w<>re,
in fact, also bonded by appellant General Insurance. Appellant misstates facts by stating otherwise. Appellant
also introduced extraneous facts not proporly part of this
action in mentioning these other two projects.
The plaintiff Mine & Smelter in selling its merchandise to Forcht Electric required purchase orders from
Forcht Electric, designating where the merchandise was
to be used. rrhe Master's Report (Exhibit P-20) verifies
that there was a purchase order for each and every invoice upon which claim was made by the plaintiff and
respondent Mine & Smelter. Forcht Electric had made
out the subject purchase orders (R. 334), and the Master
verified that the subject material was, in fact, used on
the project. This was done by a visual inspection of the
premises with an experienced electrical appraiser. (R.
496, 497, 799, 568) The Master further verified and confirmed delivery of merchandise from suppliers by directing and receiving correspondence to such suppliers of
Mine & Smelter. (R. 547, 551) The trial court in awarding judgment to plaintiff did so on the basis of the Master's Report, (Exhibit P-20) exhibits submitted by the
parties, and some 613 pag(~S of testimony which clearly
and convincingly demonstrated the plaintiff's valid
claim, for which it had not been paid. rrhe appellant seeks
to muddy the otherwise clear waters hy attempting to introduce extraneous and nonapplicahle matters.
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The evidence in this case shows that Brezina Construction selected the document entitled "lien waiver,"
(R. 917, 918, 922, 860) and Forcht Electric filled out the
lien waiver listing certain invoices (R. 933, 334, 354, 355,
360, 361) and presented it to Mine & Smelter for signature. Mine & Smelter did sign the lien waivers and did
receive checks from Forrht Electric totaling the amount
of the invoices listod upon the lien waiver. (Exhibit P20 and R. 933) The Master's Report indicates that proper
credit for payment was given in each case. (Exhibit P-20
and R. 94-95) In those cases where the Master or the
court indicated a credit should be given, a credit was
awarded. This is reflected by the court's minute entry
(R. 299-300) and findings of fact.

It should be noted that the Master was Main LaFrentz, a noted firm of certjfied public accountants who
carefully scrutinzed the records and transactions of the
parties in this action. After some 472 hours of investigation and research, this report was rendered to the court
at a cost of $6,691.43. The Master's Report (Exhibit P20), at page 3 states:
It was not practicable to ascertain that all
charges were for materials actually utilized in
the construction of the Trade Tech Administration Building. However, substantially all invoices
for major items such as fixtures, transformers,
and panels, appear to represent charges for
materials placed in service in the Administration Building.
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The Master's Report clearly supports the verdict rendered by the court.
The court in this case first heard evidence of the
execution of lien waivers and the facts surrounding their
use. It should be noted that murh of appellant's brief
devotes itself to transactions between Forcht Electric
and Mine & Smelter of which it claims Brezina should
have received knowledge. There was never shown any
relationship creating any such duty. Further, we would
like to point out that Brezina was dismissed from the
proceedings by stipulation of the parties. (R. 835-837)
Consequently, the real parties in interest are only 11...,orcht
I-~Jectric and General Insurance Company of America.
Although General Insurance wrote the subject bond and
was surety thereon, the record is silent as to any action
it took or required to protect the risk it had undertaken.
The evidence in this case clearly demonstrates that
the project designated as "Trade Tech" was the Trade
Technical Administration Building, the subject of this
lawsuit. ( R. 614, 615, 67 4) No other testimony adduced
at trial indicated otherwise.
Much to-do is raised by the appellant about altered
purchase orders; and iu support of thi8, reliance is placed
upon a witness, Mr. Alphonso GaJlego~;, and his deposition. The court, howevPr, might be swayed away from the
eredibility of this witness whf'n on cross-examination the
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witness admits that Mine & Smelte,r was not aware, of the
alteration of purchase orders (R. 742, 749, 751) ; although
previously the witness Alphonso Gallegos stated he believed that Mine & Smelter knew of such practice. The
purchase orders that appeared to be altered had already
been paid.
Th<l alteration of purchase orders was apparently
done only on the duplicate copies that did not go to the
plaintiff. (R. 742) However it should be pointed out that
Forcht Electric altered the purchase orders. (R. 741)
Brezina or General Insurance could complain against
Forcht, but they are in no position to complain against
Mine & Smelter. r:rhere was no showing in this action
that Mine & Smelter received any of Brezina's money
for materials not supplied to the Trade Technical College.
Concerning Mr. Alphonso Gallegos it should be further pointed out that his credibility is somewhat impaired
by his apparent contradicting testimony; and his employer, Forcht Electric, states that he was terminated from
his employment for stealing. (R. 771, 772)
The appellant at no time made any showing of any
changed purchase orders for merchandise claimed to be
delivered but unpaid by defendant Forcht. Any claim for
credit for material alleged to have been used elsewhere
was not supported by any evidence whatsoever. In fact,
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"\Vililam Forcht, the president and manager of Forcht
Electric, stated that when material went elsewhere, it was
subsequently replaced. (R. 770, 771)

POINT I
THE COURT PROPERLY RULED IN HOLDING THE
DOCUMENTS ENTITLED "WAIVERS OF LIEN" TO BE
RECEIPTS

FOR PAYMENT OF

INVOICES AND

NOT

WAIVERS OR RELEASES.

Title 38 of the Utah Code Annotated entitled "Mechanics Liens" specifically states in Section 38-1-1, "Public
buildings not subject to Act.The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to
any public building, structure or improvement.
See also Mountain States Co. v. Nuttall - Allen Co., 63
Ut 384, 390, 225 P. 811, 813 (1924).
A workman or materialman cannot acquire a lien
on a public building for the labor or mate,rial furnished in the construction of such a building, but
that he has a prior or preferential right to the
monies in the hands of the public corporation to
be used in the constn1ction of the building is evidently the intent of the several acts of the Legislatun~ as discussed and considered by this court
in two former opinions.
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Since there is clearly no lien on a public project, the
court must then look to the documents to detennine their
significance. In Seal v. Tayco Inc. 16 U2d 323, 326 P2d
50:~3, 505 ( 1965), the court stated:
In case of uncertainty as to meaning of contract,
it should be constrrn'd most strictly against its
framer.
In this case the evidence is clear that Brezina selected
the document to be used. (R. 917, 918, 922) Since Brezina
selected the document and the language to be used therein,
thf' elementary rule of law applies that the document will
be most strongly construed against the party who drafts
the same.
Secondly, if a document is ambiguous, then parol
evidence may be introduced to ascertain its meaning. In
this regard Brezina and General Insurance are the parties
who contend that the subject lien waiver operated as a
release; consequently, they had that burden of proof.
The document itself does nothing to assist Brezina and
General Insurance in this regard as the document speaks
of the waiving and releasing all lien or right of lien.
Since there cannot be a lien on a public building, these
words do not connote the meaning the appellant urges.
See Exhibits D-1 through D-9 for copies of the subject
lien waivers.
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The court, having found the lien waiver documents
ambiguous, \Ye next come to the question of what effect
the listing of invoices on the waiver of lien has upon the
document. Should the court construe the general, inconsistent and ambiguous language to be a release of a nonexistent lien or should it honor the specific language
present on the lien waivers acknowledging payment of
specific invoices listed. The law is clear that specific
provisions prevail over the general provisions if in conflict or inconsistent. Kaiser Hawaii Kai Development
Co. v. JJ!lurray, 49 H 214, 412 P2d 925 (19G6). See also
Waterway Terminals Co. v. P. S. Lord JJ!lechanical Contractors, 242 Or. 1, 406 P2d 556 (1965 ).
The liens themselves talk about releasing "the following described property . . . to wit:", then list the
subject invoices. The words "to wit'' on the subject lien
waiver designate the items released. (See Exhibits D-1
through D-9) See also testimony of Mine & Smelter credit
manager .Tess Hess for his explanation of "to wit" referring to the invoices listed. (R. ~~44, 345) Brezina and
General Insurance argue that the court committed error
in its determination that the waiver of liens were receipts
for payment. Since Brezina prepared the subject documents and it is construed most strongly against them and
in turn against their surety General Insurance, who are
they to complain they got not what they bargained for.
The law did not require them to use th0 particular document they s<>lected. Howe ver, they proceeded to prepare
1
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and use the inarticulate document entitled "waiver of
lien" despite the fact that counsel for Brezina stated that
Brezina was going to nse more caution with Mine &
Smelter. (R. 826)
Brezina set in motion the document they selected.
(R. 917, 918, 922) They received not one lien waiver
but, in fact, nine. (Exhibits D-1 through D-9) On each
of these there is clearly listed the invoices for which payment is acknowledged and receipted. Further, there is
uncontroverted testimony that they received a list of all
invoices from plaintiff on the subject project. (R. 937)
The fact that they received no materials directly by
delivery from the plaintiff does not alter the fact that
the materials supplied by the plaintiff were used in the
bujlding Brezina had contracted to build. So they cannot
argue that they received nothing. It should be pointed out
that there is a sentence on the bottom of each lien waiver
that Forcht Electric is certifying that the certain labor
or materials or both receipted for were actually performed or used on the described property. (See Exhibits D-1
through D-9)
The appellant urges the court to assume the fact
that Brezina would not have released money to Forcht
without proof of payment of the Mine & Smelter account.
This line of reasoning holds no foundation because there
is no showing that the amount of monthly payment to
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Forcht from Brezina has any relationship to the amount
of money listed on the monthly check from Brezina to
Forcht. (See R. 919, 922) Checks were sent as percentage
progress payments.
The facts surrounding the preparation and execution
of the subject lien waiver::; support the court's finding
concerning the lien waivers.
1. The appellant General Insurance Company, having failed in its attempt to read into the waiver of lien
a complete release, then claims the lien-waiyer document
states "AU'' materials, but the document does not have
the word "All" materials but the language is "materials
furnished." (See Exhibits D-1 through D-9)
2.

rrhe testimony of witnesses of appellant to the

effect that Brezina had Mine & Smelter's assurance that
the account was paid to what Brezina refers to as a "cut•> 1' L'

date" is not substantiated by the testimony of witness-

es. The following are excerpts from the transcript of
appellant's witnesses:
George Bauman, local manager of Brezina states he
and his secretary called each month Mine & Smelter's
bookkeeper to ascertain if the Forcht account was paid
to date. (Mrs. Johnson, R. 896, 897, 898, and 899) (Mr.
Bauman. (R. 906, 908, 909)
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However, on cross-examination, there appears real
doubt as to whether either of these people called at all.
(Mrs. Johnson R. 901, 902, 903, 904) (Mr. Bauman,
R. 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917) The various conversations
allude to talking with Mr. Hess of Mine & Smelter; however, there is the statement by Mr. Hess of Mine &
Smelter that no telephone conversations occurred. (R.
93f,) The trial court is the finder of facts and may choose
to believe that testimony it finds is the more convincing.
Cross-examination of George Bauman, vice president
and local manager of Brezina shows conflict in his own
stories concerning conversations concerning this matter.
(R. 852-856)
3. The subject lien waivers did not purport to cover
all materials of the prior month. Jess Hess of Mine and
Smelter testified that some invoices were listed on lien
waivers before they were actually billed. (R. 939) Exhibit
P-13 demonstrates there was a continual carry over from
one lien-waiver pt>riod to another. Forcht Electric's
bookkeeper selected the invoices to be listed. (R. 354, 375)
4.

Since Brezina was dismissed, (R. 835-837) any

conduct towards Brezina does not necessarily benefit General Insurance as they took no active part in protecting
the risk they had assumed.
5. There is no evidence that Mine & Smelter ever
c011ducted itself as though the alleged cut-off dates paid
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Forcht Electric's account to that specific date. The contrary is shown. (R. 371) William Forcht of Forcht Electric admits on cross-examination that he never discussed
cut-off dates with plaintiff's employees. Mr. Hess, credit
manager of plaintiff, says that the date shown was merely
Forcht's approximate time they received money from
Brezina. (R. 405) Appellant admits payments to Forcht
without regard to the sum of invoices. (Appellant's
Brief No. 16, p. 20)
Not all parties to the transaction considered the
dates listed on the subject waivers of lien as cut-off dates
or of being of any significance. Mine & Smelter was told
otherwise: (R. 404, 405)
Q.

Now, Mr. Hess, after Mr. Forcht had commenced to receive these materials, was there
any discussion at a later date about his payment on the Trade Technical Administration
Building?

A.

Yes, there was.

Q.

When did that discussion occur?

A.

rrhat would have been early in 1966.

Q.

And where did this discussion occur?

A.

Mr. Forcht's office.
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Q.

Who was present Y

A.

Myself and Mr. Forcht.

Q.

And will you state what that conversation
wast

A.

Mr. Forcht explained to me that it would be
necessary for him to furnish some type of
receipt to Brezina Construction Company
and this would be in a lien form that I would
have to sign such with the designated invoices
so that he could get his money and pay me.

Q. In this particular instance, was there any
conversation as to what invoices, or what how the invoices would be selected that would
be listed on these lien waivers Y
A.

No. Mr. Forcht did indicate that he would
have his bookkeeper pick the oldest invoice
first.

Q.

And how were these invoices selected to value?

A.

Generally, I believe from the list that I furnished.

Q.

Now, was there any conversation at that time
concerning the lien waiver being a complete
releaseT

A.

No.
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Q.

Did you ever have any conversation \vith Mr.
:B.,orcht relative to that lien waiver being a
·
complete releasl~ ~

A.

No.

Q.

And was there anything mentioned about it i11
this convernation about the dat<· of the 25th
of the month that was pnt on the lien waived

A.

'l1here was one. 'l1here was one mention of the
-one mention in connection with the Forcht
Electric Company in that he said it was ther(~
to coincide with the approximate time they
received money from Brezina.
POINT II

THE DEFENDANTS BREZINA CONSTRUCTION AND
GENERAL INSURANCE COMP ANY OF AMERICA ADMITTED IN THEIR ANSWERS AND ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS THE EXECUTION OF
THE PAYMENT BOND UPON WHICH THIS ACTION IS
PREDICATED.

In plaintiff's complaint, count II, paragraphs 2, 3,
and 4, (R. 2, :-3) the plaintiff clearly alleges that the appellant execntPd a material payment bond in compliance with
rritle 1-1- of the Utah Code Annotated. Plaintiff clearl)'
inforrns thP appellant that it at->si>rb ih; claim against

17
the surety of such bond and further alleges it hat1 given
proper notice as required by § 14-1-6 of Utah Code Annotated. (R. 2,3) The appellant in its answer and later
in an amended answer admits tht- exeeution of the bond
in compliance with the statute quoted. (R. 13, 166) In the
request for admissioni:;; by plaintiff (R.17) and in answers
to the requests for admi~·sio11s by appellant, there is an
admission of the e):eeution of tl1e subject bond. (R. 20,
28)
At a later date a pret1·ial was held pursuant to Rule
16 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, wherein the
issues were formulated. At this pretrial the court set
forth the narrow issue of the lien waivers so the court
conld rule upon their meaning. (R. 133) A trial was held
wherein the court found that the lien waivers were adjudged receipts for the payment of certain invoices and
were not a full and compleh~ release. (R. 160, 161)
rl'hereafter, a secoud pretrial was held in which the
court allowed the appellant to amend its answer but further ruled that thB plaintiff need not respond to the
answer as everything contained therein is deemed denied.
(R. 177) After inspection of certain records the court
admonished the defendants to be prepared to admit those
items on which there waf' apparently no contest. The
conrt set a further date to consider the appointment of a
Master. (R. 177, 178) LatPr, Main LaFrentz & Co. was
appointPd a~ Mastm"

(R l 79, 180) Subsequently, the
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court concluded the trial of the case, and at no time did
the appellant come forward with any evidence showing
that the subject bond did not meet the minimum require. .
ments of the statute. It was not until the filing of its brief
that the appellant first raised this point.
The fact remains that the answers to requests. for
admissions still admit the execution of the subject bond.
In its last pretrial order the court did clearly indicate
"the plaintiff need not respond to the second amended
answer as everything contained therein is deen1ed denied." (R. 177) Therefore, it would appear that the
appellant did have the burden at that late date of going
forward and showing that the bond was not executed
pursuant to~ 14-1-5 Utah Code Annotated as alleged for
the first time in its brief.
The point now raised by appellant as to the bond
failing to meet the requirements of the statute appears
to be an affirmative defense; and, consequently, the appellant had the burden of going forward on this matter.
Since the appellant failed to go forward, failed to put on
any evidence on the matter and failed to argue this point,
it would appear that appellant has waived this defense.
Since the appellant later amended its already amended
answer alleging an affirmative defense, it was incumbent
upon appellant to require the court to formulate a new
issue at pretrial.

Thereafter, the appellant had the

burden to present evidence supporting its contention
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on the issue and then argue the law and facts concerning
this issue or make a motion to dismiss alleging the bond
failed to comply with the statute.
POINT III
THE COURT PROPERLY RULED IN AWARDING JUDGMENT TO THE PLAINTIFF.
Tht~

record is clear that the invoices listed on pages
30 and :n of appellant's brief were paid and are not part
of Mine & Smelter's claim. Exhibit D-42 clearly lists these
invoices as paid. The court at the trial states: (R. 698,
line 7)
The Court:
The record may show that all items listed, at least
from my observing the Master's Report, Plaintiff's
Exhibit 20, all items listed on D-42, the Master's
Report shows that these items have been paid.
The plaintiff asked the Master if these particular
items listed in Exhibit D-42 might not be washed out (or
considered not in controversy) as having been paid.
The Master, in discussing basic accounting procedures as
to the Master's Report, states concerning these items paid

... "It was ordered, it 'vas billed; it was paid." (R. 446)
In further explaining the basic accounting procedures, the
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Master speaks of washing out certain items. Explanation
of good accounting practices and good common sense
(something there fortunately is still no law prohibiting)
dictates that there is no dispute where an item is ordered,
it is billed, and it is paid. (R. 681-684, 692-693)
The law is clear to what plaintiff must show as to the
furnishing of materials under the bonding law. Section
14-1-6 of the Utah Code Annotated, as amended (1953),
states:
Claims for labor or material furnished - Suit
on contractor's payment bond - Procedure Limitation - Every claimant who has furnished
labor or material in the prosecution of the work
provided for in such contract in respect of which
a payment bond is furnished under this act, and
who has not been paid in full the·refor before the
expiration of a period of ninety days after the
day on which the last of the labor was done or
performed by him or material was furnished or
supplied by him for which claim is made, shall
have the right to sue on such payment bond for
the amount, or the balance thereof, wnpaid at the
time of institution of such suit and to prosecute
such action to final judgment for the sum or sums
justly due him. (Emphasis added)
The statute quoted above clearly states claimant ...
"shall have the right to sue on such payment bond for
the amount, or the balance thereof unpaid at the time
of institution of such suit." (Emphasis added.)
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The burden plaintiff had in this case is not sustaining the entire amount of invoices that defendant Forcht
de~ignated as being for the r_i~rade Tech. Administration
Building as appellant urges but only tho·se items which
aro unpaid at the institution of the suit. The case of
Mellen v. Vondor-H orst Bro~. et al., 44 Utah 300, 307, 140
Pac. 130, 133, (1914), in f,peak:ing of the bonding statutes
states:
rrhe statute we have quoted is, in and of itself,
highly remedial, and must thus, in furtherance
of justice, receive a liberal construction and a~
i>lication so as to accomplish its real object and
purpose.
Counsel for respondent cites the following cases
construing the Miller Act, the Federal counterpart of the
bond quoted above, using similar language to that quoted
in the Mellen case. In Foi£rt v. United States, 235 F.2d
433, 435 (10th Cir. 1956), the court stated:
The provisions of the Miller Act, Title 40, U.S.C.A.
§ 270a et seq., requiring persons holding contracts
with the United States for the construction, alteration, and repair of any public building or public
work to furnish honds for the protection of the
persons supplying labor and material, is to be
liberally constrned to carry out its purpose.
The Fnitrt cas<' is similar to the case at hand. It is
a case involving the federal honding statute and is a suit
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by a supply house for electrical materials furnished to a
public building and against a bonding company where
an electrical contractor failed to make payment for the
said materials. The court went on to say at page 435:
"The Miller Act permits recovery when the materials have been furnished in the prosecution
of the work and does not require that the labor
or material furnished be actually used or incorporated into the contract work . . . That this rule
has been followed in this Circuit in a case on all
fours with the instant one, is seen from Commercial Standard Ins. Co. vs. United States for Use of
Crane Co., 213 F.2d 106 (1954). There Judge
Pickett, after reciting a state of facts practically
parallel to those narrated above, traces the decisions o.f trial courts, Courts of Appeals and the
Supreme Court of the United States, which formed
the basis for the rules herein announced. In the
Crane case, the bond furnished pursuant to Section 270a, supra, was held to cover materials furnished by the contractor and which though not
actually used in the performance of the contract,
replaced identical material taken from the contractor's stockpile used by the contractor on the
job.

In the case at hand, e-ven where there is the allegation that materials sold for the Trade Technical College
Administration Building went elsewhere, William C.
Forcht, the electrical contractor, states that there was a
1

1
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replacement of these materials. (R. 770-771) Appellant
in its brief at page 33, citf~s numerous other cases of
similar holding that the l'espondent could further cite to
bolster its position.
The Master in its report, Exhibit P-20, and in testimony concerning ifo report, does meet the burden on the
test just quoted (R. 483-572) This would appear to meet
the requirement of the reliable evidence from which it
can rea3onably be inferred that the labor and material
for which suit is brought went into the prosecution of a
bonded job. Commercial Standard Insurance Co. vs. U.S.

for the use of Crane Co., supra.
The Utah court has announced its view as to bonding
companies and their duties in the modern day in the type
of action at hand. After pointing out that sureties were
formerly gratuitious and were objects of special consideration by courts of equity, the Utah court in Utah State

Building Comm. vs. Great American Indemnity Co., et
al., 105 Ut. 11, 26, 140 P.2d 763, 770, (1943), stated:
Sureties in moden1 business are quite able to take
care of themselves. They select their own risks
and can, by contract, maintain surveillance over
the disposition of the funds received on the contract upon which they are surety. The misapplication of funds is one of the hazards of suretyship.
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There is no evidence to show that plaintiff had knowledge of material being used elsewhere than on the job
designated on the purchase order for the subject materials. (R. 742, 823) Appellant overlooks the fact that the
plaintiff was supplying materials to the defendant Forcht
on other accounts, and the plaintiff similarly required
purchase orders of the defendant Forcht on these other
projects. (R. 744, 745) The Master did find on the unpaid items for which plaintiff makes claim that they did,
in fact, go into the subject public building. The Master
even took an independent electrical estimator to the
premises to verify some i terns they were unable to ascertain for themselves. (R. 496, 497, 499, 568)
The record of some 612 pages is replete with evidence
to justify the court's findings. Respondent would briefly
set some of these forth:

1. Admission of Forcht Electric although attempting to claim the subject lien waiver operated a.s a complete release, nevertheless, William C. Forcht admitted
in his deposition that his company at the completion of
the Trade Technical College still owed Mine & Smelter
some $36,460.74 (R. 377, 378, 875) and in his deposition
dated November 14, 1967, at page 6 there was a dispute
of approximately some $5,321.57 due to an increase in
price of fixtures prior to their being ordered by William
Forcht. (See vVilliam Forcht Deposition, 14 November,
1967, (R. 589, 594)
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2. There is no evidence that Mine & Smelter ever
contended the waivers of lien to be anything but acknowledgment of payment of invoices. In fact, Mine & Smelter
delive·red a list of invoices to Bre:,';ina during the process
of the job so that Brezina could check off the subject
invoices. (R. 408)
3. Forcht Eledric deliyered checks to Mine & Smelter indicating on its check "Total invoices listed on Lien
-waiver." (See Exhibits 17, 18, 19)
4. Full credit has been given for each and every invo]ce listed in the subject lien waivers. (See Exhibit 20)
5. Brezina was still withholding certain funds on
Forcht at the time of the trial of this action, to wit
$5,000 according to Brezina; (R. 865) $15,000 according
to Forcht. (R. 874)
6.

William C. Forcht certified that materials listed

on subject lien waivers were, in fact, used on the Trade
Tech Administration Building. (See Exhibits D-1 through
9)

7.

The trial court based upon the evidence adduced,

the Master's Report and various exhibits did enter a
minute entry and findings of fact in which certain items
it found were not properly charged to the Trade Tech-
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nical College Administration Building. (See minute entry
R. 299-300; See findings of fact and conclusions of law
R. 275-279)
Where trial court's finding in action at law without a
jury is supported by competent evidence, it is binding
on the Supreme Court on appeal. See Beagley vs. U.S.

Gypsum Co., 120 Utah 487, 235 P.2d 783 (1951). The
Utah Supreme Court has spoken even stronger language
concerning the trial court's finding. If there is substantial, competent evidence which is relevant and material,
the finding of the court will not be disturbed although
the court might well have found otherwise. Tracy Loan
& Trust vs. Openshaw Inv. 102 Utah 509, 132 P.2d 388
(1942). The Utah Supreme Court has further held that
in an action for an accounting, findings based on conflicting testimony will not be disturbed on appeal unless it
appears that the court misapplied proven facts or that the
findings are clearly against the weight of the evidence.
Bear River State Bank vs. Merrill, 101 Utah 176, 120
P.2d 325 (1941).
Respondent urges the court to note that nowhere
does the appellant state that the facts are uncontroverted.
The record is clear that the proven facts as found by the
court are supported by clear, substantial and competent
evidence.
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POINT IV
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S DEFENSE OF ESTOPPEL.

Tlrn appellant continually alludes to the plaintiff
Mine & Smelter preparing the lien waivers in this case.
There is not one scintilla of evidence, that lien waivers
were p1~epared by anyone other than Forcht Electric.

(lt.354,355,360)
Appellant in dl\Speration to find an appealable matter next di,scusses what logically should have been done
as to listing of the invoices on the lien waiver documents.
The court is not interested in what the appellant feels
logically should haye been done but only tries the issues
as facts present themselves. It would appear since appellent attempts to rely upon facts not actually done but
what it appears logically should have been done, that
the basis for an appeal does not exist.
There are no grounds for the appellant to even allege
an estoppel. The estoppel, if any, would have been an
action that Brezina may have pursued had it remained
in the subject lawsuit. Brezina, however, was dismissed
from the lawsuit upon stipulation of all parties; and,
therefore, the defense of estoppel was removed from the
lawsuit. (R. 835-837)
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There is no evidence to show that General Insurance
Company of America did anything to ascertain if the
general contractor and his subcontractors were, in fact,
paying their bills. Again we would quote the rule announced in the case of Utah State Bitilding Board for
the use and benefit of Mountain States Supply vs. Great
American Indemnity Company, sHpra, 105 Utah 11, 2!J,
30, 140 P.2d 763, 770:
It is generally held that in order for silence to
work an estoppel, there must be a legal duty to
speak, or there must be something willful or culpable in the silence which allows another to place
himself in an unfavorable position by reason
thereof. See Eltinge v. Santos, 171 Cal. 278, 152
Pac. 915, Ann. Cas.1917A 1143.

The facts in the instant case would not justify any
such conclusion. It was the duty of Campion and
the surety to see that the materialman was paid
and it would seem logical that they, having this
duty, should see that the duty was discharged before the funds were disposed of. It seems more
in accord with good business practice that the
contractor and his surety see that their own obligations are discharged than to reqHire the materialrnan to inform the contractor that the sHbcontractor was not paying his bills. (Emphasis
added)
In the case at hand, appellant failed to show any
legal duty on the part of Mine & 8melter to disclose
Forcht Electric's financial condition. Further, Forcht's
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financial condition appeared to be common knowledge
of all parties. At the very start of this project, Brezina
k1ww that Forcht Electric could not bond because of
its financial condition. (R. 858, 923)
The trial court as the finder of facts having heard
all of the evidence and yiewed the conduct of witnesses
is in a better position to determine the facts as to what
wa:> actually done. rro support its position, appellant
places great reliance on a very poorly drafted document
entitled "Lien Waiver" and on "phantom phone calls";
there i:s a real conflict in evidence as to whether these
telephone calls, in fact, occnrred. (R. 852-856, 901-904,
912-917' 935)
The Master's Report is conclusive in showing that
proper credit was given for each invoice listed upon the
subject lien waivers. (See Exhibit P-20) Nowhere do
the facts show that the lien waivers listed invoices for
which credit has not been given.
Again, respondent reiterates facts previously quoted:
"Brezina selected the lien waiver docmnent and Forcht
Electric prepared it." Mine & Smelter in each and every
case gave appropriate credit fot each and every invoice
listed on the subject document.
As to the cases cited hy appellant in its brief as to
the defonse of estoppel, we believe those cases are dis-
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tinguishable from the case at hand on their facts and,
consequently, are not in point.
First, is the case of Pittsburg Steel Co. v. Standard
Accident Insurance Company, 55 F. Supp. 36, 37 (Dist.
Ct. E.D. So. Carolina, 1944). In this case the court had
no controversy as to the facts and had before it one single
lien which states as follows:
C. E. Richenback, Assistant Treasurer, Pittsburg
Steel Company, a subcontractor, who being by me
first duly sworn, deposes and says, that all claims
for labor employed and/or materials furnished
or used by him in and about erecting of the RDX
plant known as the Wabash River Ordinance
Works, mentioned and referred to in the release
of which this affidavit is a part, have been paid in
full.
This language is certainly more clear and less ambiguous than in the instant case; also, there is a release
of all claims cited in addition to the waiver quoted above.
In the case at hand, the court felt the document to be
construed was ambiguous and required parol testimony
to establish its meaning and intent. The lien in the Pitsburg Steel case also states that the materials furnished
have been paid in full. In the case at hand there, is no
such statement, but rather a statement that the material
was furnished on or before a certain date. Also, in the
Pittsbitrg Steel case there is a false s\vorn receipt of payment. There is no such false sworn statement in the

31
case at hand. Full credit has been given for each and
every invoice listed upon the subject liens.
As to the case of Kansas City Marble & Tile Co. vs.
Penker Constntction Co., et al., 86 F.2d 287 (4th Cir.
1936), there was but one document entitled "Complete
Waiver of Lien" in which it waived and released "any and
all lien~, claims and right to lien for any and all work,
labor, material by them:selves furnished or which may
be furnished by themselves or which may be furnished
in and about the premises." The court further found
that th(~ contractor relied on this instrument and made
payment. The court went on further to say at page 288:
As there could be no lien upon the public building,
we think it clear that the word "claims" should be
('Onstrued as having reference to claims under the
bond for materials furnished, since it is clear that
petitioner intended by the execution of the waiver
to assure the general contractor that petitioner
would assert no claims against him for materials
furnished. . .
In the case at hand there were a series of liens, and
they do not speak of a complete release of claim and
further spell out certain invoices of which they acknowledge payment. The word ''claims" is not present in
the lien waiver forn1 used in the case at hand but it merely
refers to "lien or right of lien." The language in the case
at hand appears more ambiguous and required evidence
to determine the parties' intent. Certainly, if it were.con-
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tended that the liens release all materials in the past and
future, it would not be necessary to execute and receive
several liens, Exhibits D-1 through 9, as was done in
this case. Then the lien waivers refer to specific invoices;
therefore, the court could certainly find that these are
what the parties intended to release. It should, again be
noted that the Master found that Mine & Smelter did,
in fact, give appropriate credit for each and every invoice
~ited. Further, it is clear from the evidence that the
plaintiff did not intend by the signing of the lien waiver
presented that it would assert no claim against the contractor or its surety for materials furnished. The trial
court found to the contrary and rightly so and awarded
judgment against the defendant appellant bonding company.
CONCLUSION
The lower court properly ruled that the waivers of
lien were receipts for invoices listing the subject materials
purchased by Forcht Electric and not releases as claimed
by the appellant. The trial court properly found that
judgment should be entered against the appellant General
Insurance Company for the bond executed in this matter.
The trial court having heard all the evidence presented
was in the best position to render judgment and to properly and correctly arrive at the present verdict. The
evidence presented was substantial, competent evidence.
There was no showing by appellant that the trial court
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misapplied proven facts or that the findings were clearly
against the weight of the evidence. Since the appellant
failed to meet its burden of proof required in this matter,
tht~ court could not have ruled other than for the plaintiff
and respondent.
Respectfully submitted,

D. CLAYTON FAIRBOURN
of Turner and Fairbourn
Valley Professional Plaza
2525 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Attorney for Plaintiff and
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